In its so-called
Heads of Argument (that is, in its closing arguments), the defence has
attempted to clarify that Pistorius cannot be guilty of murder.
Interestingly,
it ends up more or less substantiating that he actually is.
The
"heads" give three examples of situations where someone is killed
and the killer may or may not be considered a murderer. In the first example,
the defence contends the killer cannot possibly be considered a murderer. In
the second, he can. In the third, he again cannot, unless certain conditions
are met.
The
defence's assertion is that the Pistorius case falls into the first
category, and not in the second or third.
From my own
point of view, however, that clearly misstates the actual situation.
Before I explain
this further, let's look at the three examples the defence offers, and the
conclusions it draws from each instance.
Example One
A mother of
a three year old girl hears a noise in her home. She thinks she's being
burgled, and so gets her gun and heads towards the noise. She then hears the
sound of her bedroom door closing. She fires a shot through the bedroom door,
thinking that's where the burglar is. Instead, she hits and kills her daughter.
"It
offends against legal principles", the defence states, "our legal
conviction, and common sense, that in the absence of intent to kill her
daughter, the mother must be convicted of murdering her daughter."
Example Two
X wants to
kill Y. X thinks he sees Y and fires his gun. It turns out the person he thought
was Y is actually Z, who simply resembled Y. Z dies.
In this
case, "it does not offend the legal or moral conviction", the defence
maintains, "that (X) be convicted of murder, as he had the intention to
kill the very person he had mistakenly identified and shot at."
Example
Three
A wants to
kill B. He shoots his gun, but misses B and instead hits C, who dies.
A can only
be convicted of the murder of C, the defence states, "if he foresaw the
possibility of C's death when he shot and he reconciled himself with the
foreseen possibility."
So, three
examples. But which of these three examples best fits the Pistorius case?
Well,
certainly not the third one. In the third example, after all, there are two
distinct individuals, B and C. A wants to shoot B, but accidentally shoots C. His
intent to kill is restricted towards B; he has no intent to harm C at all.
This is, by
the way, exactly the same situation that I pointed to in my first post on this
trial. As I said then, the example is a classic one, but it is, in fact,
substantially different from the Pistorius case.
So we are
left with the first two examples.
The first
question one might ask when considering them is what the real differences
between the two examples are.
Well, they
might be a lot more similar than you may at first think. Firstly, whilst there
is clearly a distinction made in poignancy - the first example is presented very
much as a terrible domestic tragedy, the second is presented quite prosaically -
that distinction has no legal merit at all.
After all, if
you wished to, you could easily shift the "poignancy" aspects from
the first to the second example, and the two examples would remain legally unaltered.
So that's not
it. What is, then? Well, there is also the fact that in the first example, the
killer does not see who she is shooting. If she had, she would not have fired;
it would have been clear that it was her daughter, and not a burglar. Again,
though, that is not a meritorious distinction; again, you might alter some of
the details, circumvent that very distinction, and end up with an example that
would, from a legal point of view, remain unchanged.
So is there
actually any difference between the two examples? Well, no, there isn't. The
only difference that I can think of that might possibly exist would be that in
the first example, there is some room for doubt on the mother's part. After all,
she thinks that, besides herself, there are two other people in the house: the
burglar and her daughter. But she doesn't exactly know where each of these is.
Shooting through a door because of a sound she had heard without exactly
knowing who made that sound allows for the argument that she is basically just
guessing whom she is shooting at. Because of this, it might possibly be argued
that a certain distinction could be made between the intent the mother has towards
the burglar, and the lack of intent she has towards her daughter. However, in
that case, we are actually not talking about the first example at all; instead,
we are talking about Example Three, where there are two distinct individuals.
In the
second case, it should be said, even such a theoretical distinction simply does
not exist. As the defence acknowledges, the killer most assuredly had the necessary
intent towards killing his victim. He may have mistaken the identity of his
victim, but that in itself does not change his intent.
Now, let's
get back to the Pistorius case. Which of the three scenarios best describes the
situation Pistorius found himself in?
Well, at
first glance, the answer would seem to be that Example One fits the bill. In
that example the mother tragically kills her daughter, whilst Pistorius might
be considered to have tragically killed his girlfriend. Both thought they were
being burgled. Both fired through a closed door.
However, on
the basis of the above, one should conclude that, even if that were to be the
case, Pistorius would still be guilty of murder. The first example - as can be
seen when it is shorn of its "poignant" aspects - is actually the
same as the second. And even if there is a distinction to be made between the
two, that distinction does not apply to Pistorius: Pistorius was not "guessing"
as to whom he was shooting at. He thought there was only one person in the
toilet and that person was the burglar. He shot at that person and he hit that
person. He did exactly what he wanted to do (*); there was no
"guesswork" involved. His only mistake was in the identity of the
person in the toilet, which is exactly the mistake made by the killer in the
second example.
So, where
does that leave us? Well, with the rather curious fact that the defence itself seems
to have acknowledged that Pistorius
should be convicted of murder. I'm fairly certain they didn't mean to, but they
managed it - and managed it quite well - nevertheless.
Is that the verdict that will be handed down? Well, of that I'm not at all certain. From the manner in which the case has dragged along, and, more importantly, from the manner in which the judge has acquitted herself, I would not be surprised if Pistorius actually manages to scrape by with a culpable homicide conviction.
___________
(*) I am of
course aware that the defence (and indeed, Pistorius himself) has argued that
the shooting was "an accident", and that he was not actually shooting
in order to hit the supposed burglar. That, however, is a different issue
altogether. I have dealt with some of the legal ramifications of this "accidental" plea in Part Two of this series.
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